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ESSAY
A TWENTIETH AMENDMENT PARABLE
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE*
INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, there was a constitutional amendment that
had avoided all of the disputes characteristic of constitutional law.
The Supreme Court had never even mentioned it. Only four district
court decisions had in any sense turned on the Amendment's mean-
ing.' Law schools did not hold symposia exploring the subtleties of
the Amendment. The definitive law review article on the Amend-
ment had yet to be written.2 The most attention the Amendment re-
ceived was as an example of a constitutional provision so
straightforward that it generated few of the interpretive controversies
that lurked elsewhere in the Constitution.
3
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University. B.A., 1982, Indiana University;
J.D., 1986, University of Michigan. I am indebted to Akhil Amar, Barbara Armacost, Phil
Frickey, Abner Greene, Ed Hartnett, Sanford Levinson, Lisa Nagle, Mike Paulsen, De-
anell Tacha, and Bill Treanor, each of whom offered many helpful suggestions and com-
ments on this Essay. I also benefited from a roundtable discussion on Seminole Tribe held
at the Seton Hall University School of Law on April 19, 1996. Erik Daab and Mark Epley
helped me locate some of the history of the Twentieth Amendment discussed below, and
Deborah Levi provided wonderful editorial assistance. Any remaining mistakes are my
own.
I See Humphrey v. Baker, 665 F. Supp. 23, 30 (D.D.C. 1987) (determining that Twenti-
eth Amendment allows Congress to receive messages from President even when it is not in
session), aff'd, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec.
Org. of the Gov't of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (finding it likely that
executive order concerning frozen Iranian assets had not been promulgated before Presi-
dent Carter's term of office expired under Twentieth Amendment); Socialist Workers
Party v. Ogilvie, 357 F. Supp. 109, 113 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (holding Twentieth Amendment
does not bar a state from excluding presidential candidate who does not satisfy Article II
eligibility requirements from general election ballot); Ashley v. Keith Oil Corp., 7 F.R.D.
589, 590-91 (D. Mass. 1947) (concluding that new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not
become effective because Eightieth Congress had not adjourned within meaning of Twenti-
eth Amendment); see also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 37 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing
effect of Twentieth Amendment on congressional adjournment practices in suit contesting
alleged pocket veto), vacated sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy v.
Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (same).
2 This isn't it.
3 See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, A Very Rational Court, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 1509, 1583
n.449 (1993) (citing Twentieth Amendment as example of mechanical constitutional right);
David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76
Iowa L. Rev. 1, 2 n.8 (1990) (citing Professor Levinson's example of Twentieth Amend-
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The text of that Amendment-the Twentieth Amendment-of-
fers little indication of its potential sweep. The first two sections are
particularly unspectacular. They provide:
Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall
end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators
and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years
in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been
ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January,
unless they shall by law appoint a different day.4
The dates in section 1 replaced the March 4 inauguration date fol-
lowed by long-standing practice and implicitly adopted by the Twelfth
Amendment.5 Section 2 replaced Article I, section 4, clause 2, which
had provided that Congress must begin its term on the first Monday in
December.6 Together, sections I and 2 seem limited-important only
to members of Congress and their aides who must arrive in (or leave)
Washington two months earlier than the framers had originally speci-
fied. One would never suspect that the drafters of the Twentieth
Amendment considered section 1 the crux of the Amendment, or that
the reason they did so has any enduring interest for constitutional law
today.
ment as rather straightforward provision); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L
Rev. 373,382 n.33 (1982) (citing Twentieth Amendment to demonstrate that "the Constitu-
tion is not entirely incomprehensible"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Ar-
ticle V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale Li. 677,
694 n-54 (1993) (using Twentieth Amendment as example of precise constitutional
provision).
4 U.S. Const. amend. XX, §§ 1-2. The other sections of the Twentieth Amendment are
similarly direct. Sections 3 and 4 govern various presidential succession questions; section
5 gives the effective date for sections 1 and 2. See U.S. Const. amend. XX, 88 3-5. See
generally Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitu-
tion's Succession Gap, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 215, 216-21 (1995) (discussing ambiguities in sec-
tions 3 and 4). Section 5 set the effective date as March 15 after ratification, and section 6
gave the states seven years to ratify the Tventieth Amendment once Congress approved it
in 1932. See U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 5-6.
5 See U.S. Const. amend. XII (providing that "if the House of Representatives shall
not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the
fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President"); see
also infra text accompanying notes 61-64 (discussing historical practice of setting presiden-
tial and congressional inauguration dates).
6 U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year,
and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law
appoint a different Day."). Both Section 2 of the Twentieth Amendment and the original
provision of Article I allowed Congress to set a different date to begin its session.
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Then one day the Supreme Court decided a case called Seminole
Tribe v. Florida.7 Seminole Tribe was an Eleventh Amendment case:
it invalidated a federal law requiring states to negotiate with Indian
tribes regarding gambling operations.8 Three Justices wrote a com-
bined sixty-seven pages and referred to twelve different constitutional
provisions,9 but not the Twentieth Amendment. Yet Seminole Tribe,
by reaffirming a history of countertextual constitutional interpreta-
tions, could breathe life into the TWentieth Amendment. For if one
approaches the Twentieth Amendment as the Supreme Court ap-
proached the Eleventh Amendment in Seminole Tribe, then GATT,
CERCLA, and Stephen Breyer become unconstitutional.
I
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."' 0 The text suggests several results concerning who may bring
suit, what suits are covered, the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and
the immunity of state governments. Seminole Tribe, like other deci-
sions before it, rejected them all.
The Eleventh Amendment's text bars only specific types of
claims. The language deprives federal courts of diversity jurisdiction
over certain suits against states but leaves the federal question juris-
diction of federal courts unaffected. Article III, which provides the
context for the Eleventh Amendment, extends the federal judicial
power to "Controversies... between a State and Citizens of another
7 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
8 See id. at 1119 (holding that Indian Commerce Clause did not grant Congress power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity and that doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), could not be used to enforce Indian Gaming Regulatory Act against state official).
9 That is sixty-seven pages in the Supreme Court Reporter; the case will occupy far
more space in the official U.S. Reports. The opinions referred to the Indian Commerce
Clause, see id. at 1119, 1121-22, 1125-27; the Interstate Commerce Clause, see id. at 1125-
28, 1142; the Contract Clause, see id. at 1137. 1140, 1153, 1156, 1167; the Uniform Bank-
ruptcy Clause, see id. at 1142; the Copyright Clause, see id. at 1142; several provisions of
Article III, see id. passim; the Supremacy Clause, see id. at 1171, 1178, 1182, 1184; the
Seventh Amendment, see id. at 1176; the Tenth Amendment, see id. at 1126 n.10, 1139,
1158 n.23, 1185 & n.65; the Eleventh Amendment, see id. passim; the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, see id. at 1125, 1128, 1131 n.15, 1134, 1142, 1159, 1173, 1185; and the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, see id. at 1149 n.7. Justice Souter's dissent contains another interesting cita-
tion, see Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1169 nA3 ("Regardless of its other faults, Chief
Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, [60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)] .... "),
thus making Justice Souter the first Justice to turn to that opinion for authority in 89 years.
See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81 (1907).
10 U.S. Const. amend. XI.
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State" (one aspect of diversity jurisdiction) and to "all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Au-
thority" (federal question jurisdiction).1 A comparison of that lan-
guage with the language of the Eleventh Amendment caused Chief
Justice Rehnquist to concede in Seminole Tribe that "the text of the
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article I diversity ju-
risdiction of the federal courts."1 Nonetheless, the Court reasserted
that the Eleventh Amendment applies to federal question jurisdiction
as well as to diversity jurisdiction.13 As Chief Justice Rehnquist ex-
plained it, "'[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand
not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition... which it
confirms."" 4 That presupposition maintained that states possess the
traditional immunity of a sovereign absent their consent to suit.15 The
Eleventh Amendment nowhere refers to sovereign immunity-it
speaks only of federal court jurisdiction-but the Court did not feel
constrained by this wording. The Court identified the general purpose
of the Amendment as confirming state sovereign immunity, and it
used that purpose to fashion the interpretive rule applied to the case
before it.
Likewise, the Amendment's specification of "any suit in law or
equity" would seem to leave admiralty suits untouched. Article M
distinguishes between "Cases ... in Law and Equity" and "Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; 116 the Eleventh Amendment re-
11 U.S. Const. art. IH, § 2, cl. 1.
12 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122; see also id. at 1150 (Souter, J.. dissenting) (observ-
ing that "the text of the Amendment does, after all, suggest to common sense that only the
Diversity Clauses are being addressed"); accord Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1, 24 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment only reaches di-
versity jurisdiction and noting works of "numerous scholars" that refute interpretation of
Eleventh Amendment as coextensive with sovereign immunity); id. at 31 (Scalia. J., dis-
senting) (summarizing argument, which he later rejects, that text merely creates exception
to diversity jurisdiction); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 286"9, 299
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that plain language of Eleventh Amendment
reaches only diversity jurisdiction and plain language interpretation avoids "extravagant
assumptions about the unexpressed intent of Congress and the state legislatures").
13 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122.
14 Id. (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)); see
also id. at 1127 (noting that it has been "well established ... that the Eleventh Amendment
stood for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity limited the federal
courts' jurisdiction under Article in"); id. at 1127-28 (stating that "the Eleventh Amend-
ment reflects 'the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of
judicial authority in Article III" (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 97-98 (1984))); id. at 1131 (reconfirming "the background principle of state sover-
eign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment").
15 See id. at 1122.
16 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 1997]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
fers only to the former. The Court, however, has long held that the
Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from admiralty suits in fed-
eral courts.17 Again, the Court has relied on the Eleventh Amend-
ment's implicit adoption of existing state sovereign immunity, which
applies to admiralty cases as much as it does to other kinds of cases.
The departure from the text's explicit scope cuts both ways. Fed-
eral courts may entertain suits against state officials in their official
capacities for injunctive and prospective relief, but not for damages.18
Here, too, the Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment pursu-
ant to its purposes instead of its words. The Amendment was
designed to protect a state's finances, 19 a concern most implicated by
damage awards enforceable against the state treasury, and one out-
weighed by the Supremacy Clause interest in empowering federal
courts to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law.20 But such a pro-
spective/retroactive distinction is not even suggested by the Eleventh
Amendment's words.
The Amendment's description of the affected plaintiffs has met a
similarly countertextual fate. "Citizens of another State" and "Citi-
zens or Subjects of any Foreign State" cannot bring certain suits
against a state in federal court.21 The text says nothing about the abil-
ity of a state's own citizens to sue their state in federal court.22 Yet the
17 See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472-73 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (acknowledging that admiralty suits are not suits in equity or law, but
reaffirming that admiralty suits are barred by principle if not language of Eleventh Amend-
ment); Ex parte New York, No. 1,256 U.S. 490, 497-500 (1921) (justifying broad interpreta-
tion of plain text by calling "any suit in law or equity" an example of general Eleventh
Amendment state immunity which bars admiralty and maritime cases as well). But see
Welch, 483 U.S. at 497-504, 509-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court should
honor exclusion of admiralty jurisdiction from Eleventh Amendment's protections).
18 See Halderman, 465 U.S. at 102-03 (interpreting Eleventh Amendment as permitting
suits against state officials but barring damage claims); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
662-71 (1974) (barring action where judgment would necessarily be paid from state
treasury).
19 See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994) (holding that
Eleventh Amendment did not immunize interstate railroad created by New York and New
Jersey pursuant to Interstate Compact Clause because judgments against railroad would
not be paid from state treasury).
20 See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (holding that Eleventh Amendment
bars claims for declaratory and "notice relief' against state for past violations of federal
law); Halderman, 465 U.S. at 104-06 (finding that Eleventh Amendment bars federal court
from ordering state officials to act in accordance with state law).
21 U.S. Const. amend. XI (emphasis added).
22 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1134 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(insisting that "[t]here can be no serious debate... over whether Congress has the power
to ensure that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the State being sued");
id. at 1152 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that there is no textual basis for reading Eleventh
Amendment to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over all cases brought by state's own
citizens); see also Frederick Schauer. Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 424 (1985) (using
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distinction between citizens of a state and citizens of another state has
long since been jettisoned by the Court.23 Nor does the Eleventh
Amendment appear to restrict federal jurisdiction over suits brought
against a state by a foreign government, yet the Court has extended
the Amendment to cover those cases as well. 24 The broad general
purpose of the Amendment as confirming state sovereign immunity,
relied upon by the Court in Seminole Tribe, provides the foundation
for those extensions of the Eleventh Amendment as well.
Whatever the scope of the Amendment, its language does not
contain any exceptions. The Eleventh Amendment withdraws federal
jurisdiction over "any suit" that it covers25 The Amendment thus ap-
pears to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain certain suits
against a state regardless of what that state or Congress says. But the
Court allows a state to consent to suit in federal court,2 6 and it allows
Congress to abrogate a state's immunity from suit in federal court pro-
vided that Congress clearly indicates its intention to do so.27 The con-
gressional abrogation power arises from "the important role played by
the Eleventh Amendment and the broader principles it reflects,'"2 in-
cluding the balance between state and federal power inherent in the
federalist system established by the Constitution.29 The principle of
federal power is limited itself; thus, the Court's actual holding in Semi-
nole Tribe prevents Congress from abrogating a state's immunity
Eleventh Amendment as example of Court's reliance on purpose of rule instead of its text
and noting that "[n]othing in the language of that amendment could even remotely be
construed to bar the use of the federal courts by citizens suing their own states").
23 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1144 n.18 (Stevens, 3., dissenting) (describing Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), as "the first case in which the Court held that a State could
not be sued in federal court by one of its citizens").
24 See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,330 (1934) (holding that state
retains same immunity in suits brought by foreign states as in suits brought by citizens of
United States).
25 U.S. Const. amend. XI (emphasis added).
26 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122-23 (noting that "it is undisputed that Florida
has not consented to the suit"); id. at 1136 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that
"'plain text' of Eleventh Amendment" does not allow state to consent to suit in federal
court, but citing Court's contrary decision in Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,447 (1SS3)).
27 See id. at 1123-24.
28 Id. at 1123 (emphasis added).
29 See id. at 1122 (noting that Eleventh Amendment confirms principles of federalism
and sovereign immunity (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890))); see also
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989) (finding Congress did not intend to abro-
gate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Education of the Handicapped Act); Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 (1985) (holding that Rehabilitation Act
does not abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity and state's acceptance of funds
under Act does not establish consent to suit in federal court).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 1997]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
under the Eleventh Amendment when Congress acts pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause or the Interstate Commerce Clause.3 0
The dissenters in Seminole Tribe interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment differently, but they, too, were willing to explore the
Amendment's broader purposes. Justice Stevens focused on the case
that prompted the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment-Chisholm
v. Georgia3 1-as a justification for reading the Eleventh Amendment
more narrowly.32 If the purpose of the Amendment was to overrule
Chisholm, then it should be interpreted to reestablish the status quo
ante. Justice Stevens acknowledged that the text of the Eleventh
Amendment is broader than would have been necessary simply to re-
ject Chisholm,33 but he nonetheless contended that Justice Iredell's
dissent in Chisholm "correctly stated the law" applicable today.34 Jus-
tice Souter's dissent sought to demonstrate that the Eleventh Amend-
ment did not constitutionalize eighteenth-century common law
notions of sovereign immunity. He chastised the majority for its de-
parture from the Eleventh Amendment's text, but he was unwilling to
reverse the case that served as the primary point of departure.3S Jus-
tice Souter focused more on history than text, too, as demonstrated by
the forty-one pages he wrote to explain the meaning of the forty-three
words of the Eleventh Amendment.
30 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124-32. The Court thus overruled Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in which a badly divided Court had allowed Congress to
rely on its Interstate Commerce Clause power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The Court's unwillingness to distinguish between the Interstate Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, doomed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994), at
issue in Seminole Tribe. Indeed, the Court said that no Article I power could be used to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, see Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32, thereby
confining such abrogation power to the provisions of subsequent Amendments. See
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (upholding congressional power under
Fourteenth Amendment to subject states to suit in federal court).
31 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Chisholm held that the federal courts possessed jurisdic-
tion to decide a suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina to collect money that the state
of Georgia allegedly owed for the sale of military goods during the Revolutionary War.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1467-73 (1987)
(stating that holding in Chisholm provoked call for constitutional amendment); John J.
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, 1920-26 (1983) (relating decision in Chisholm and subsequent
adoption of Eleventh Amendment to concerns about enforceability of provisions of Treaty
of 1783 with Britain). The Eleventh Amendment followed in 1795. See, e.g., Seminole
Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting) (mentioning ratification of Eleventh
Amendment in 1795).
32 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1134-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33 See id. at 1136 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35 See id. at 1159 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the Hans Court misread the
Eleventh Amendment" but refusing to overrule Hans because of stare decisis).
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The lesson of Seminole Tribe and prior Eleventh Amendment
cases is that the purposes of a constitutional provision can provide
rules for decision far in excess of the constitutional text. This is not a
new insight.3 6 Such purposive interpretation lives elsewhere in consti-
tutional law. The Court will often "strive, when interpreting... semi-
nal constitutional provisions, to effectuate their purposes." 37 But such
statements usually appear in the course of interpreting the First
Amendment,38 the Fourteenth Amendment 39 or similar open-ended
constitutional provisions. The implications of such purposive theories
for some of the forgotten provisions of the Constitution have gone
unnoticed.
The interpretive method employed in Seminole Tribe gives
the Twentieth Amendment a whole new meaning. For the purpose
of the Twentieth Amendment was to abolish lame-duck sessions
of Congress. That was the universal understanding voiced by
the Congress that approved the Amendment,40 the earlier Con-
gresses that considered similar proposals,41 contemporary legal
36 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342, 1344-45 (1989) (observing that all current theories of Eleventh
Amendment rely on its purposes more than its text); Frederick Schauer, The Occasions of
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 729, 744 (1992) (noting Court's willingness
to consider constitutional arguments that rely on provision's purpose instead of its words).
37 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 187 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id. at
187 n.4 ("[V]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819))).
38 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that "the mean-
ing of the [Establishment] Clause is to be determined by reference to historical practices
and understandings").
39 See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1995) (interpreting Equal Protection
Clause to further "[i]ts central mandate [of] racial neutrality in governmental
decisionmaking").
40 See, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 3836 (1932) (statement of Rep. Cartwright) ("This amend-
ment will free Congress of the dead hand of the so-called 'lame duck."'); id. at 3833 (state-
ment of Rep. Dickinson) ("This will put an end to the 'lame-duck' Congress ... ."); id. at
3823 (statement of Rep. Stafford) (describing purpose of Amendment as "to discontinue,
to put a stop for all time to these lame-duck sessions of Congress"). For similar statements,
see id. at 3868 (statement of Rep. Dickinson); id. at 3824 (statement of Rep. Greenwood);
id. at 3870 (statement of Rep. Howard); id. at 3832 (statement of Rep. Lozier); id. at 3841
(statement of Rep. Norton).
41 See, e.g., 74 Cong. Rec. 5892 (1931) (statement of Rep. Johnson of Tex.) (stating that
Amendment "would abolish what is popularly known as the lame-duck session of Con-
gress, so that all sessions of Congress convening after congressional elections would not
have in its membership those who were not elected at the last preceding election"); id. at
5891 (statement of Rep. Johnson of Okla.) (asserting that purpose of Amendment "is to
eliminate what is commonly called the lame-duck session of Congress"); id. at 5903 (state-
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scholars, 42 and everyone else.43 Indeed, what we now know as the
Twentieth Amendment was commonly described as the "lame-duck
amendment" while it was being debated.44 The long-standing popular
outcry over the actions of defeated or retiring officials during the pe-
riod after an election and before the inauguration of their replace-
ments finally resulted in the ratification of the Twentieth Amendment
in January 1933, only ten months after it had been approved by
Congress.45
ment of Rep. Selvig) ("The principal change involved is the abolition of the so-called
'lame-duck' session of Congress."). But see id. at 5894 (colloquy between Rep. Oliver of
N.Y. and Rep. Gifford indicating confusion about whether an outgoing Congress could
meet after election but before January 3).
42 See, e.g., Andrew C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States 788
(student ed. 1935) (explaining that the Twentieth Amendment "ended ... the power of
Congress to legislate for several months after a new Congress was chosen by the people");
G.A.C., Jr., The Proposed Twentieth Constitutional Amendment, 21 Geo. L.J. 63, 64
(1932) ("This proposed Amendment, popularly called the 'Lame Duck' Amendment, has
for its primary object the abolishment of 'lame ducks' and 'lame duck' sessions of Con-
gress."); Bruce L. Keenan, T'ventieth Amendment Kills Lame Ducks, 4 Okla. St. B.J. 91,
91 (1933) (stating that Twentieth Amendment curbed potential for legislators to serve in
congressional session after defeat in elections).
43 See, e.g., The Lame-Duck Amendment, Saturday Evening Post, Dec. 17, 1932, at 20
(observing that "the major provision [of the TIWentieth Amendment] is the elimination of
lame-duck sessions of Congress, in which members sit after having been defeated for re-
dlection"). See generally 74 Cong. Rec. 5886 (1931) (statement of Rep. Knutson) (observ-
ing that "for years it has been one of the favorite pastimes of newspapers and magazines to
attack the so-called lame-duck sessions of Congress"); Richard Lowitt, George W. Norris:
The Persistence of a Progressive 518 (1971) (noting that Senator Norris "congratulated the
newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst for 'the magnificent fight they made in
behalf of the "Lame Duck" Amendment"').
44 See, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 3839 (1932) (statement of Rep. Glover) ("This amendment
has been freely referred to by the press and others as the 'lame-duck amendment."); id. at
4118 (statement of Sen. Norris) (referring to "the so-called 'lame duck' amendment"); id.
at 3822 (statement of Rep. Pou) ("[The Amendment] is known throughout the country, I
believe, as the so-called 'lame duck' amendment to the Constitution."); 74 Cong. Rec. 5893
(1931) (statement of Rep. Stobbs) (noting that "the newspapers, in commenting on this
amendment, have universally described it as the lame-duck amendment"). The Amend-
ment dealt with both lame-duck Congresses and lame-duck Presidents, though the former
received the most attention.
45 The commencement date for congressional sessions was the subject of well over 100
proposed constitutional amendments and bills between 1795 and 1932. See G.A.C., supra
note 42, at 63 (noting proposal of at least 90 constitutional amendments and 93 bills con-
cerning congressional sessions). Sections 1 and 2 of the Tventieth Amendment evolved
from numerous amendments considered by Congress in the decade before 1932. Senator
George Norris, a Progressive Republican from Nebraska, was widely acknowledged as the
father of the part of the Amendment that dealt with lame-duck Congresses. See, e.g., 75
Cong. Rec. 3829 (1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia) ("Senator George Norris is the
author of this resolution."); 74 Cong. Rec. 5898 (1931) (statement of Rep. McCormack of
Mass.) (explaining that portion eliminating lame-duck sessions of Congress was "more fa-
miliarly known as the Norris amendment"). See generally Lowitt, supra note 43, at 155-57,
274-77, 515-18 (describing Norris's effort to abolish lame-duck Congresses); George W.
Norris, Fighting Liberal 328-43 (1945) (chapter in Norris's autobiography entitled "The
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Lame-duck sessions of Congress were targeted for a number of
reasons. The original justifications for the lame-duck period had be-
come outdated. Advances in transportation shortened the months it
took to travel across the country to Washington in 1789 to a few days
by 1933. Advances in communications made it possible to learn the
results of an election within a matter of hours or days instead of
weeks. Passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1917, authorizing
the direct popular election of Senators, precluded the need to wait for
state legislatures to meet to elect Senators. Each reason suggested
that the dates provided in Article I and the Twelfth Amendment had
outlived their usefulness."
Experience with lame-duck Congresses yielded still more com-
plaints. Lame-duck members of Congress suffered from perverse in-
centives. On the one hand, once defeated, members were
unaccountable to the electorate. On the other hand, outgoing mem-
bers were viewed as susceptible to pressure from the President and
from special interests. Many feared that the desire to obtain new em-
ployment once service in Congress ended-voluntarily or involunta-
rily-would influence the votes of an outgoing Senator or
Representative. As Representative Celler argued:
[T]his is the lame-duck resolution. What is a lame duck? A lame
duck is a wild bird that has been hit with a bullet by a hunter and is
Lame Duck Amendment"). Norris himself credited a resolution introduced by Senator
Caraway in 1922 calling for defeated members not to participate in anything besides rou-
tine legislation during a lame-duck session. See id. at 329-30; see also 63 Cong. Rec. 25-27
(1922) (statement of Sen. Caraway).
46 Representative Norton discussed each reason:
[I]f we did not have our modem means of communication, if we had no tele-
graphs, no telephones, no radios, and no fast-mail service, we would be com-
pelled to wait, as they were in those days, for weeks before the result of an
election in one part of the country could be known in another part thereof....
If conditions were now what they were 145 years ago, we would not have our
present system of good roads, but would have roads that would be almost im-
passable; there would be no automobiles, no train service, no airplanes, and we
would be compelled to rely on the stagecoach and the saddle horse for our
travel. Under such conditions it would take weeks, and perhaps months, even
after the result of the election had been learned, before the Congress could
assemble and become organized.... Following the ratification of the Constitu-
tion, and in fact until quite recently, the United States Senators were elected
by the legislatures of the various States. The State legislature did not meet
until in January, and since contests often developed, it was considerably later
than that before selections were announced. Senators so elected could not
have attended a session of Congress convening in the month of January.
75 Cong. Rec. 3841 (1931) (statement of Rep. Norton); accord S. Rep. No. 72-26, at 2
(1932) (discussing how modem technology and transportation make Constitution's previ-
ous commencement dates moot); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the
Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 125-27 (1995) (discuss-
ing framers' concern with when and where federal government should meet).
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brought down. It is not killed, merely lamed and wounded. It is
usually tractable, docile, and is easily tamed. So it is with lame
ducks in this House and probably in the other House. They have
been hit with the shot of defeat by their constituents, and they have
become very lame, docile, and tractable, and when they have jobs
dangled before them they do the bidding of the Executive or those
who may be in power.47
Most importantly, the actions of lame-duck Congresses were seen
as inconsistent with representative democracy. The supporters of the
Twentieth Amendment proclaimed that the voice of the people in an
election was supreme.as That proposition demanded that the electoral
mandate of the people should be put into effect immediately. New
members of Congress should take their seats soon after the election.4 9
Outgoing members of Congress who lost their bids for reelection were
characterized as no longer representative of the people and no longer
entitled to participate in legislative actions.50 Indeed, one of the more
47 75 Cong. Rec. 3828 (1932) (statement of Rep. Celler); see id. at 3843 (statement of
Rep. Black) (reasoning that lame duck's anxieties for future make him amenable to Execu-
tive's suggestions); id. at 3836 (statement of Rep. Cartwright) (noting influence of favors
from White House on lame ducks); id. at 3833-34 (statement of Rep. Dickinson) (warning
of special interest groups' special influence over lame ducks); id. at 3842 (statement of
Rep. Norton) (stating that promise of later appointment may sway lame duck); 63 Cong.
Rec. 26 (1922) (statement of Sen. Caraway) (same); Norris, supra note 45, at 332 (discuss-
ing President's use of potential appointments to sway lame-duck members of Congress).
48 See, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 3864 (1932) (statement of Rep. Stafford) ("The voice of the
people in the election of their representatives is the supreme law of the land."); 74 Cong.
Rec. 5880 (1931) (statement of Rep. Glover) ("We are a Nation that says the people ought
to rule . ... "); id. at 5898 (statement of Rep. McCormack of Mass.) ("The making of a
legislative body responsive to the will of the people is the object of self-government and of
representative government.").
49 As Representative McCormack declared, "In a representative government it is es-
sential that the will of the voters immediately go into effect and operation." 74 Cong. Rec.
5898 (1931) (statement of Rep. McCormack of Mass.); see 75 Cong. Rec. 3842 (1932)
(statement of Rep. Black) (arguing government should act on people's will as soon as
possible after election); id. at 3831 (statement of Rep. Cable) (same); id. at 3828 (statement
of Rep. Celler) (same); id. at 3834 (statement of Rep. Dickinson) (same); id. at 3839 (state-
ment of Rep. Glover) (same); id. at 3824 (statement of Rep. Greenwood) (same); id. at
3829 (statement of Rep. LaGuardia) (same); 74 Cong. Rec. 5890 (1931) (statement of Rep.
Leavitt) (same); id. at 5887-88 (statement of Rep. Maas) (same); id. at 5888 (statement of
Rep. Nolan) (same); id. at 5899 (statement of Rep. Quin) (same); id. at 5893 (statement of
Rep. Stobbs) (same).
50 For example, Representative Barton noted:
The defeat of a candidate is often the rejection by the electorate of the laws he
advocates. It is an anomaly, to say the least, for a man to hold a commission by
which he can write into law principles after they have been rejected and repu-
diated by his constituents.
75 Cong. Rec. 3874 (1932) (statement of Rep. Barton); see id. at 3842 (statement of Rep.
Black) ("Their very presence, after repudiation, is a denial of representation."); 74 Cong.
Rec. 5886 (1931) (statement of Rep. Lozier) (arguing that "it is un-American, undemo-
cratic, unrepublican to allow him to remain in office two or three months after the repudia-
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restrained supporters of the Amendment argued that "for a person to
continue to represent a constituency after his defeat, is contrary to the
whole plan and philosophy of a representative system of govern-
ment."51 Thus, the proponents of the Twentieth Amendment assured
that it would eliminate unrepresentative lame-duck sessions of
Congress.
Such sessions posed another threat. The Twelfth Amendment
charged the House with choosing the President in the event that no
candidate received a majority of the electoral college votes.5 Three
Presidents-Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and Rutherford
B. Hayes-had been elected by the vote of the House.5 3 They were
chosen by the lame-duck House, not the incoming House elected at
the same time that they ran for President. The supporters of the
Twentieth Amendment wanted to ensure that any future selections of
the President would be made by the new members of the House who
would take office on January 3.4
tion of his policies by his constituents"). Others voiced similar sentiments. See, e.g., 75
Cong. Rec. 3831 (1932) (statement of Rep. Jeffers) (calling lame-duck government con-
trary to people's wishes); id. at 3832 (statement of Rep. Lozier) (same); id. at 3842 (state-
ment of Rep. Norton) (same); id. at 3824 (statement of Rep. Greenwood) (criticizing lame
ducks as contrary to principles of representative government); 74 Cong. Rec. 5S98 (1931)
(statement of Rep. McCormack of Mass.) (same); id. at 5881 (statement of Rep. Celler)
(calling it travesty to allow lame ducks to continue legislating); id. at 5891 (statement of
Rep. Johnson of Okla.) (same); id. at 5897 (statement of Rep. Luce) (same); Norris, supra
note 45, at 332 (observing that permitting men to mold legislation after their repudiation
by people is contrary to reason and precedent).
51 74 Cong. Rec. 5885 (1931) (statement of Rep. Sumners).
52 See U.S. Const. amend. XII.
53 See 74 Cong. Rec. 5881 (1931) (statement of Rep. Celler) (noting that lame-duck
members participated in House's election of those three Presidents). The House elected
Thomas Jefferson pursuant to its power under Article II, section 1, clause 3, which was
superseded by the "Mvelfth Amendment in 1804.
54 For example, Representative McKeown insisted:
[T]he vital thing that underlies this legislation is, in the event an election of the
President of the United States is thrown into the House of Representatives
that that election will be conducted by new Congressmen coming directly from
the people, who have the interest of the people at heart when they come to
cast their votes in that election.
75 Cong. Rec. 3857 (1932) (statement of Rep. McKeown); see S. Rep. No. 72-26, at 5
(1932) (noting that proposed amendment would mean House of Representatives with fresh
popular mandate would select President if duty to elect devolved to House); 75 Cong. Rec.
3824 (1932) (statement of Rep. Greenwood) (criticizing ability of lame-duck members to
vote for next President); id. at 3842 (statement of Rep. Norton) (same); 74 Cong. Rec. 5897
(1931) (statement of Rep. Luce) (same). Like the desire to eliminate lame-duck congres-
sional sessions entirely, instructions concerning which Congress is to elect the President in
the event that no candidate receives a majority of the electoral college votes are conspicu-
ously absent from the text of the "Iventieth Amendment. See Amar, supra note 4, at 218
(speculating on resolution of electoral college deadlocks in absence of explicit direction
from Twentieth Amendment text); cf. Amar & Amar, supra note 46, at 131-32 (explaining
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The opponents of the Twentieth Amendment shared this under-
standing of the impact of the Amendment on lame-duck Congresses.
Indeed, they championed lame-duck members of Congress as worthy
legislators even if the people had decided to replace them. Some of
these comments betrayed highly elitist tendencies by depicting de-
feated members as the victims of an ignorant and ungrateful popu-
lace.55 Lame-duck members were also praised as independent from
partisan and popular demands.5 6 They were seen as deserving of the
opportunity to finish their legislative agenda, to counsel their replace-
ments, and to make the transition back to private life.57 The lame-
duck period was glamorized as a necessary cooling-off period during
which electoral passions could subside.5 8 The most fervent opponents
of eliminating the lame-duck period characterized the Twentieth
Amendment as an attack on the Congress and the framers of the Con-
stitution, though they could not agree who was responsible for such a
plot.59 But their position failed to carry the day. For the most part,
how Speaker of the House who lost November election could nonetheless serve as Presi-
dent during subsequent two years).
55 See 74 Cong. Rec. 5879 (1931) (statement of Rep. Underhill) (describing lame duck
as "a victim of mob psychology"); id. at 5878 (defining lame duck as "'a defeated states-
man,' particularly recently, for those who have been defeated for office in recent years
were more entitled to the designation of 'statesmen,' as a rule, than those who succeeded
them").
56 See 75 Cong. Rec. 3853 (1932) (statement of Rep. Tilson) (arguing that lame-duck
session "is one time in the life of a Member of Congress when he can vote his real convic-
tions without the hope of reward or the fear of punishment").
57 See, e.g., 74 Cong. Rec. 5890 (1931) (statement of Rep. Blanton) ("A man who has
given 20 years of his life in service here, after being unexpectedly defeated in the Novem-
ber election, should have a few months in which to readjust himself back into private life
again."); id. at 5878 (statement of Rep. Underhill) ("This lame-duck session has given [out-
going Representative Cramton] an opportunity to gather up the loose ends, to put across
many of the measures which have been proposed from year to year, to finish up his work
and to prepare the place for his successor."); see also id. at 5890 (statement of Rep.
Blanton) (defending lame-duck period as helpful for training new members and as fair to
outgoing members).
58 See 75 Cong. Rec. 3837 (1932) (statement of Rep. Montague) (advocating a "cooling
time" to "give them some time to get free of the atmosphere of partisanship"). Represen-
tative Knutson elaborated:
In the heat of campaigns candidates are apt to make rash promises that are
incapable of fulfillment, and I may say to you it would be dangerous to con-
vene a new Congress within 60 days after an election unless we took the newly
elected Members and placed them on ice, thereby giving them an opportunity
to reflect and cool off before taking their seats in this body.
74 Cong. Rec. 5886 (1931) (statement of Rep. Knutson). But see 75 Cong. Rec. 3841-42
(1932) (statement of Rep. Norton) (arguing against "cooling-off period"); 74 Cong. Rec.
5888-89 (1931) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia) (same); id. at 5888 (statement of Rep.
Maas) (same); id. at 5888 (statement of Rep. Nolan) (same).
59 Compare 75 Cong. Rec. 3836 (1932) (statement of Rep. Montague) ("I think 'lame-
duck Members' is a capitalistic terminology to destroy the usefulness of the legislative
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 72:470
TWENTIETH AMENDMENT PARABLE
the supporters of the Amendment refrained from criticizing individual
lame-duck members, but they insisted that it would be undemocratic
for such members to continue to legislate after the people had spoken
in the election.
Yet the text of the Twentieth Amendment does not seem to abol-
ish lame-duck Congresses; it only shortens the lame-duck period from
four months to two months. That unavoidable fact suggests that (a)
the proponents of the Twentieth Amendment were astonishingly poor
drafters, (b) the commitment to abolish lame-duck Congresses was
qualified by some other consideration, or (c) the drafters expected
that changing the beginning of congressional terms to January 3 would
accomplish the goal of abolishing lame-duck congressional sessions.
The probability of (a) is diminished by the attention focused on the
Amendment during the ten years that it was debated in Congress. In-
deed, one overconfident supporter announced that the Amendment
had achieved "practically a perfect form, that is, embodying the last
and best word that could be said upon the subject involved.' 60 But
rather than exploring that hyperbole further. I want to focus on the
evidence that supports (b) and the greater likelihood that (c) offers
the best explanation.
How the drafters of the Twentieth Amendment expected the
move from March 4 to January 3 to abolish lame-duck Congresses re-
quires an understanding of congressional sitting practices prior to the
adoption of the Amendment. As originally drafted in 1787, the Con-
stitution provided that Congress must meet at least annually and that
its session must begin on the first Monday in December (unless Con-
gress passed a statute specifying a different date). 61 The framers chose
a December date to avoid interrupting spring planting and fall har-
vesting.62 The Constitution neglected, however, to specify when the
branch of our Government, which is the desire of some people."), with id. at 3978 (state-
ment of Rep. Griffin) (reluctant supporter of Amendment complaining that "[t]he hue and
cry about 'lame-duck' sessions is simply furnishing fodder to bolshevists"). While many
opponents of the Amendment claimed that there was no need to disrupt the work of the
framers, Representative Underhill pressed that point with special vigor. See 74 Cong. Ree.
5879 (1931) (statement of Rep. Underhill) (asking "which amendment has brought to this
country greater peace or prosperity?" and arguing that if Senator Norris's "gospel of gov-
ernment is sound .... then George Washington was a piker, Jefferson was a bum, Madison
and Patrick Henry were morons, Jefferson and John Marshall were socialists, Ben Franklin
was senile, and John Rutledge and Charles Pinckney were ward heelers").
60 75 Cong. Rec. 3832 (1932) (statement of Rep. Lozier).
61 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
62 Madison had proposed that Congress begin its annual session in May because it
would be easier to travel then than in the winter. See James Madison, 2 The Debates in the
Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of
America 350 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Prometheus Books 1937) (1920).
Elseworth responded that "[t]he summer [would] interfere too much with private business,
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terms of members of Congress would begin and end. The traditional
date of March 4 that prevailed before 1933 resulted from the happen-
stance of the ratification of the Constitution by the requisite number
of states in September 1788 and the direction of the Continental Con-
gress that the new Congress should meet on the first Wednesday in
March of the next year-March 4, 1789.63 Congress kept the March 4
date through most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, al-
beit with exceptions from time to time.64 Meanwhile, not all congres-
sional elections were held on the first Tuesday in November: House
elections occurred throughout the summer and the fall, while Senato-
rial elections were held when state legislatures happened to be in ses-
sion (until the approval of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913).
The combination of these dates resulted in a congressional prac-
tice far different from what we are used to today. While today newly
elected representatives take office and begin legislating within two
months of their election, before 1933 new representatives might wait
over a year to participate in their first legislative session. For exam-
ple, Abraham Lincoln was elected on August 3, 1846, to represent Illi-
nois's Seventh Congressional District in the Thirtieth Congress. 65
After he was elected, the Twenty-Ninth Congress returned to Wash-
ington in December 1846, where it sat until it expired on March 4,
1847. Congress did not sit between March and December 1847.
Lincoln and the other members of the Thirtieth Congress took office
in December 1847-sixteen months after Lincoln was elected.6 6 That
first session of the Thirtieth Congress continued until August 1848.67
Lincoln returned for the second session of the Thirtieth Congress
from December 1848 to March 1849, after abiding by his pledge not to
seek reelection in August 1848, thus making his second session a lame-
duck session.68
That schedule was familiar to the members of the Seventy-Second
Congress who approved the Twentieth Amendment. The two sessions
that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature being more or less connected
with agriculture," and Randolph added that a December date would better coincide with
state elections. Id. The framers chose December instead of May by a vote of eight states
to two. See id.
63 See 75 Cong. Rec. 3873 (1932) (statement of Rep. Barton); Norris, supra note 45, at
331.
64 The history of the beginning dates of congressional sessions is discussed in 75 Cong.
Rec. 3880 (1932) (statement of Rep. Gibson) and id. at 3852 (statement of Rep. Tilson).
65 See David Herbert Donald, Lincoln 115 (1995).
66 See id. at 119.
67 See id. at 130.
68 See id. at 124, 133-41. Lincoln's congressional speech opposing the Mexican War
would have made a bid for reelection problematic; his position undermined his preferred
Whig successor and led to his district electing a Democrat instead. See id. at 132-33.
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of each Congress included a long session (beginning in December and
continuing until some time the next spring or summer) and a short,
lame-duck session (beginning in December after the election and end-
ing on March 4). The only difference between Lincoln's Congress and
subsequent Congresses is that by 1933 elections were held in Novem-
ber (not August). Thus, supporters of the Twentieth Amendment re-
peatedly complained about the thirteen months-from November of
an election year until December of the next year-that elapsed before
a newly elected Senator or Representative actually began serving in
Congress. 69 The thirteen-month delay also meant that members be-
gan to run for reelection before they had much of an opportunity to
demonstrate their worthiness (or lack thereof) to the people who had
elected them.70 The delay and its consequences provided yet another
justification for the Twentieth Amendment.
But why did everyone in 1933 believe that moving the beginning
of each congressional term to January 3 would abolish lame-duck ses-
sions? The answer is simple: no one expected the outgoing Congress
to meet during the lame-duck period from election day in November
until January 3. Those who feared that the Twentieth Amendment
would result in a Congress that remained in session throughout the
entire year were assured that Congress would finish its work in an
election year by the summer political conventions.71 More specifi-
cally, Senator Norris and other sponsors of the Amendment affirmed
that Congress would not meet in December under the new system.72
69 See, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 3831 (1932) (statement of Rep. Cable); id. at 3836 (statement
of Rep. Cartwright); id. at 3833-34 (statement of Rep. Dickinson); id. at 3839 (statement of
Rep. Glover); id. at 3832 (statement of Rep. Lozier).
70 See, e.g., id. at 3842 (statement of Rep. Norton) (criticizing thirteen-month delay
because "the people whom [a member] has been chosen to represent have not had a
proper chance to properly weigh his qualifications, so as to know whether he comes up to
their expectations, before they are called upon to vote for or against his renomination"); 74
Cong. Rec. 5888 (1931) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia) ("Wre are hardly in session when
the time runs right into the next primary and the next election.").
71 See 75 Cong. Rec. 3828-29 (1932) (statement of Rep. Celler) ("The Congress would
not continue indefinitely [for] two years. That is inconceivable.... [lstead we will ad-
journ around June 15-the latest July 1-to enable us to attend the national convention.");
see also id. at 3839 (statement of Rep. Glover) ("Beginning with the 4th day of January
Congress will have ample time for the completion of all its work, and Congress could easily
discharge all of its duties by the 1st of June unless some emergency should arise that would
require a longer term."); 74 Cong. Rec. 5903 (1931) (statement of Rep. Browne) (challeng-
ing "anyone" to give example of Congress ever remaining in session past summer political
conventions); id. at 5893 (statement of Rep. Johnson of Tex.) ("During my service the long
session has never adjourned later than July.").
72 See 75 Cong. Rec. 5086 (1932) (relating that when asked by Senator Bingham if
TWentieth Amendment "does away with the December session of Congress," Senator
Norris answered "Ly]es"); id. at 3839 (statement of Rep. Glover) (explaining that Amend-
ment would eliminate expense of holding Congress in December, a "time that very little or
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The period from election day in November until inauguration day in
January would be used for transitional purposes only;73 no one men-
tioned the possibility that any legislative business would take place
during that period.74 Repeated promises that the incoming House
would choose the President if necessary-even though the Twelfth
Amendment directs the House to act "immediately" after counting
the electoral votes-confirms that a meeting of the lame-duck Con-
gress was unimagined by the drafters of the Twentieth Amendment. 75
The unwavering understanding of the Twentieth Amendment, there-
fore, was that one Congress would complete its work sometime in the
summer, that the election would occur in November, and that the new
Congress would assemble in Washington on January 3. And that un-
derstanding shows how the Seventy-Second Congress intended the
Twentieth Amendment to abolish lame-duck sessions of Congress.
This argument is strong, but not quite airtight. Obviously, the
case against lame-duck Congresses would be more convincing if the
Twentieth Amendment included a provision specifying the date on
which Congress must adjourn in an election year. If the Amendment
stated that Congress cannot sit past, say, May 4 in an election year,
then the possibility of a lame-duck session would be eliminated by the
constitutional text. Indeed, such a provision was proposed-by
Speaker of the House Nicholas Longworth, no less-but it was de-
feated. The House adopted Longworth's addition in 1931, only to see
the entire amendment die after that issue blocked an agreement with
the Senate.76 The House then declined to reinsert a specific congres-
nothing is usually accomplished"); 74 Cong. Rec. 5880 (1931) (statement of Rep. Glover)
(explaining that Congress will meet in January instead of December).
73 See 74 Cong. Rec. 5912 (1931) (statement of Rep. Schneider) (defending January 4
date because "[slufficient time is thereby allowed newly elected Members to arrange their
private affairs prior to leaving for the Capital City"); see also 75 Cong. Rec. 3878 (1932)
(statement of Rep. Griffin) (suggesting that allowing new Congress to begin meeting on
March 4-instead of following December-would eliminate thirteen-month delay while
providing sufficient transition period for incoming and outgoing members).
74 See infra text accompanying notes 78-80 (noting that Congress was aware of possibil-
ity of year-round session, but that it was assured such session would not occur because
Congress would not meet during lame-duck period).
75 See U.S. Const. amend. XII (stipulating that if no presidential candidate receives
majority of electoral college votes, then "the House of Representatives shall choose imme-
diately, by ballot, the President").
76 Longworth's amendment provided that in even-numbered years-i.e., election
years.-"the session shall not continue after noon on the 4th day of May." 74 Cong. Rec.
5902 (1931). The House approved the amendment on February 24, 1931, by a 229 to 148
vote. See id. at 5906-07. That left only seven days to reconcile the House proposal with
the Senate's version, which lacked an ending-date provision. Neither side budged, so the
amendment failed to pass Congress in 1931. See 75 Cong. Rec. 3872 (1932) (colloquy be-
tween Rep. Burtness and Rep. Jeffers) (acknowledging role played by Longworth amend-
ment in defeat of TWentieth Amendment in 1931); Norris, supra note 45, at 339-41
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sional session ending date in its 1932 version of the Amendment"7-
and that version became law. Such a conscious refusal to include an
adjournment date would seem to suggest that whatever its other rhet-
oric, Congress wanted to preserve the possibility of meeting in a lame-
duck session.
Still, the rejection of a specific ending date can be reconciled with
the assumption that lame-duck Congresses would be eliminated by the
Twentieth Amendment. Congress offered two reasons for not adopt-
ing such a date; neither reason resurrects the possibility of a lame-
duck session. First, Congress insisted on retaining the prerogative to
decide when to adjourn instead of having a fixed date written into the
Constitution.78 In response to those who feared the absence of a fixed
date would result in a Congress that met throughout the whole year,
the opponents of a fixed adjournment date assured that Congress
would adjourn for good well before the November election. 9 This
assurance provided a rationale by which members could say they were
eliminating lame-duck sessions even as they declined to establish a
specific date for the end of congressional sessions. Second, Congress
feared that a fixed deadline would perpetuate filibusters against bills
under consideration as an inflexible date drew near, as had happened
in the days before March 4 under the previous system.8' Congress,
(blaming Longworth amendment for failure of Congress to approve Twentieth Amend-
ment in 1931).
77 In 1932, the House considered a proposal that would have required Congress to con-
clude its session by June 4 in an election year. See 75 Cong. Rec. 3872-75 (1932) (reporting
debate on proposal of Rep. Warren). The House rejected the proposal by a vote of 98 to
54. See id. at 3875.
78 See, e.g., id. at 3872 (statement of Rep. Jeffers) (acknowledging need to allow for
unforeseen factors impacting date of adjournment); id. at 3874 (statement of Rep. Mapes)
(arguing that "time for adjournment... [should] be left to the discretion of future Con-
gresses"); id. at 3872 (statement of Rep. Sumners) (asserting each Congress's ability to
determine its appropriate date of adjournment); 74 Cong. Rec. 5903 (1931) (statement of
Rep. Browne) (insisting that "[t]he legislative branch... protect itself and its sovereignty
and not be a party to tying its own hands"); id. at 5902 (statement of Rep. Jeffers) ("The
Congress of the United States and the Congress alone should retain control of when it shall
meet and when it shall end .... "); id. at 5904 (statement of Rep. Lozier) (declaring that
fixing date of adjournment is tantamount to admission of congressional "impotence"); id.
(statement of Rep. Sumners) ("There is no reason why this particular Congress ... should
make it impossible by a constitutional limitation for another Congress... to remain in
session longer, as the necessities... may require."). The experience of states with constitu-
tionally prescribed legislative session dates demonstrates the wisdom of Congress in this
respect. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legisla-
tion 255 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing judicial review of legislative session time limits).
79 See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
80 See, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 3875 (1932) (statement of Rep. Mapes) (asserting that ses-
sions with automatic adjournment dates are particularly susceptible to filibusters as ad-
journment approaches); id. at 3824 (statement of Rep. Greenwood) (decrying defeat of
important legislation by tactics of minority when adjournment date is fixed), 74 Cong. Rec.
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however, never anticipated that changing the beginning of congres-
sional sessions to January 3 could operate in the same way-that a
Congress could meet up until noon on January 3 to finish its legislative
agenda. The fact that such an early January session was never men-
tioned in the debates indicates that Congress never contemplated a
postelection session.
The President's power to call Congress into session presents an-
other seeming contradiction to an understanding of the Amendment's
purpose as eliminating lame-duck congressional actions. Article II
empowers the President to convene Congress "on extraordinary occa-
sions,"81 and the supporters of the Amendment acknowledged that
power.82 An exercise of the President's power to convene Congress
could thwart the presumed abolition of lame-duck sessions of Con-
gress. Perhaps lame-duck sessions were to be prohibited except when
the President instituted such sessions. This explanation fits with the
congressional refusal to include a specific end date, but it conflicts
with the event that motivated Congress to consider abolishing lame-
duck Congresses: President Harding's call for a special congressional
session after the 1922 elections to consider controversial ship-subsidy
legislation.8 3 Or perhaps no one could imagine a President convening
a lame-duck Congress except in the gravest national emergencies,
although that theory, too, conflicts with the original objection to Presi-
5881 (1931) (statement of Rep. Celler) (advocating flexible date of adjournment which
"would balk much filibustering" and allow majority to "vote as it saw fit and wise"); id. at
5888 (statement of Rep. Maas) (arguing against "any fixed date for adjourning, which per-
mits filibustering and tricks to delay legislation and thereby defeat of the rule of the major-
ity"); id. at 5904 (statement of Rep. Simmons) (stating that one reason for Amendment is
to "get away from the necessity of bad legislation forced by a filibuster or the killing of
good legislation by the same method").
81 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (providing that President "may, on extraordinary Occasions.
convene both Houses, or either of them").
82 See, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 3823 (1932) (statement of Rep. Stafford) (assuring that
"[n]either is the power vested in the President contravened from summoning the Congress
in emergent session if required"); see also id. at 3852 (statement of Rep. Tilson) (opponent
of Twentieth Amendment noting that "the President on many occasions has seen fit, when
the public interests seemed to demand it, to convene Congress in a special session-not 13
months after election but immediately after the 4th day of March").
83 President Harding called a special session of Congress to meet on November 20,
1922, to approve ship-subsidy legislation that had been an issue in the elections held earlier
that month. The voters had rejected Harding's position. See Norris, supra note 45, at 328
(relating events precipitating Norris's resolution to abolish lame-duck Congresses). None-
theless, Harding called for a lame-duck session because he thought it "loftier statesman-
ship to support and commend a policy designed to effect the larger good to the Nation than
merely to record the too hasty impressions of a constituency." 63 Cong. Rec. 25 (1922)
(Address of the President). Harding's implicit call to reject the recent election results
prompted Senator Caraway to introduce the resolution that Senator Norris credited with
beginning the movement to abolish lame-duck sessions of Congress. See supra note 45.
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dent Harding's actions. Maybe Congress had some other solution in
mind. Whatever the answer was, today one can only speculate. The
means of reconciling the President's power to call Congress into ses-
sion and the elimination of lame-duck Congresses cannot be found in
the legislative record.
In light of this apparent loophole in the Twentieth Amendment
text, it helps to remember how convincing the historical case against
lame-duck Congresses needs to be under the Seminole Tribe approach
to constitutional interpretation. The principle that informs most of
the departures from the Eleventh Amendment's text presupposes that
the Amendment implicitly codified existing state sovereign immunity.
That principle is found neither in the constitutional text nor in direct
statements in the records accompanying the ratification of the
Amendment, but instead in the understanding of the historical context
in which the Eleventh Amendment was adopted.84 Moreover, as Jus-
tice Souter most recently demonstrated in his dissent in Seminole
Tribe, the historical context itself is subject to contradictory interpre-
tations.8 Thus, the Court has taken a background assumption appar-
ently held by the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment and
transformed it into the principle used to decide Eleventh Amendment
cases.
The evidence that the supporters of the Twentieth Amendment
assumed that their handiwork would eliminate lame-duck Congresses
is overwhelming by comparison. That is what everyone-supporters
and opponents alike-understood to be the Amendment's effect. The
scheduling practices historically followed by Congress explain why no
one thought it necessary to refer explicitly to the elimination of lame-
duck Congresses in the constitutional text. Furthermore, the inconsis-
tencies between that background assumption and the real possibility
that a lame-duck Congress could meet are far less troubling than the
debate about the assumptions attending the enactment of the Elev-
enth Amendment. Therefore, if the background assumptions held by
the drafters of the Constitution produce rules of constitutional law,
then the proponents of the Twentieth Amendment's belief that they
were doing away with lame-duck Congresses once and for all is of
more than historical interest.
84 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996) (noting Court's historical
interpretation of Eleventh Amendment as based on "'the presupposition ... which it con-
firms"' (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak. 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991))).
85 See id. at 1150 (Souter, J. dissenting) (asserting, contrary to majority, that -[t]he
history and structure of the Eleventh Amendment convincingly show that it reaches only
to suits subject to federal jurisdiction exclusively under the Citizen-State Diversity
Clauses" (footnote omitted)).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 1997]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
III
The Twentieth Amendment thus suggests that the actions of a
lame-duck Congress-or at least the actions of a lame-duck Congress
not called into emergency session by the President-are unconstitu-
tional. For example, the legislation implementing the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 86 becomes invalid. GATT
resulted from eight years of international negotiations culminating in
a comprehensive trade agreement in April 1994. Five months later,
on September 27, President Clinton submitted to Congress proposed
legislation necessary to implement the agreement. He did so hoping
for approval by the end of the year.8 7 Congress accommodated him:
the House passed the bill on November 29, and the Senate followed
on December 1.88
Consideration of GATI" by a lame-duck Congress drew signifi-
cant opposition, even from erstwhile supporters of the agreement it-
self.89 Members of Congress and others questioned the need to act so
quickly.90 They were especially critical because the election had pro-
duced a turnover of both the House and the Senate from a Demo-
cratic to a Republican majority.91 Many of the comments in the
86 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 7, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 26, 28, 29, 31, 35, 42, 47 U.S.C.).
87 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 10-11 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3773, 3782-83 (summarizing history of negotiations and congressional actions relating to
Uruguay Round Agreements).
88 See 140 Cong. Rec. S15,379 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (recording Senate approval of
GATT 76-24); 140 Cong. Rec. H11,535-36 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (recording House ap-
proval of GATT 288-146).
89 See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. S15,287 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Roth)
(voting for GATT even though "[a] lame-duck session is certainly not the best congres-
sional process for deciding the final fate of such an important issue facing the Nation"); 140
Cong. Rec. E2349 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (statement of Rep. Glickman) (lame-duck
member indicating reservations about considering GATT during lame-duck session despite
his support for substance of agreement); 140 Cong. Rec. H11,501 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Lowey) (supporting GATT though opposing consideration of major
issues by lame-duck Congress).
90 See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. S15,273 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hollings)
(wondering why lame-duck session was necessary when no industrial country had yet
adopted GATT); 140 Cong. Rec. S15,124 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Heflin) (arguing that "we shouldn't be forced to hurry this massive agreement through a
lame duck session with inadequate consideration, deliberation, or debate").
91 For example, Sanford Levinson has remarked:
Any true democrat should, at the very least, be troubled by the ratification of
GATr by the lame-duck Congress in December 1994 instead of the newly
elected Republican Congress that, for better or worse, represented an even
sharper repudiation of the prior Democratic majority than did Clinton's elec-
tion of the Bush Administration.
Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 Const. Com-
mentary 183, 185 n.4 (1995).
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debate over GAIT echoed the debate over the Twentieth Amend-
ment sixty-two years earlier.9" A revived understanding of the pur-
pose of that Amendment would vindicate the opponents' arguments
against allowing a lame-duck Congress to approve GATT.
Likewise, the Twentieth Amendment renders the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA)93 unconstitutional. Indeed, courts routinely blame
CERCLA's poor drafting on the hurry with which the lame-duck
Ninety-Sixth Congress passed-and lame-duck President Carter
signed-the bill after the November 1980 election but before Presi-
dent Reagan and a new Republican Senate majority took office in
January 1981.94 Congress had been debating hazardous waste legisla-
tion throughout 1980, but the House and the Senate had passed very
different bills. The election produced a remarkable spirit of compro-
92 See 140 Cong. Rec. S15,128 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (statement of Sen. Inhofe)
("We should postpone this vote until next year and let the newly-elected Congress, the
Congress which by definition is closer to the people, make this decision."); id. at S15,104
(statement of Sen. Byrd) (noting that lame-duck members "will not have to answer for
their vote to the judgment bar of the people at the next election"); 140 Cong. Re=. H1l,449
(daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. DeFazio) (objecting to "a vote taken at the
11th hour on the last day in a lame duck session of Congress, voted upon by many people
who have been asked to come home by the American voters because they think they are
just a little bit out of touch"); see also 141 Cong. Rec. H3903 (daily ed. Mar. 29. 1995)
(statement of Rep. Nadler) (arguing that a lame duck "is more likely to be thinking about
his or her next job instead of thinking about representing the people as they wished to be
represented [and] will be more accountable to the special interests with jobs to offer than
to the people whose ballot will be debased to irrelevance").
93 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
94 See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 381 n.6 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ob-
serving that CERCLA was passed hastily and noting inaccuracies in legislative debate sur-
rounding its passage); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 13S0 n.8
(8th Cir. 1989) (noting that CERCLA "was hurriedly put together" and "mas passed after
very limited debate by a lame duck Congress"); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New
Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) ("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or
precision. It has been criticized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities
attributable to its precipitous passage."); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (characterizing CERCLA as "eleventh hour compromise"); Cobum v.
Sun Chem. Corp.. Civ. A. No. 88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 19SS)
(noting limited guidance provided by legislative history of CERCLA); In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22,25
n.2 (D. Mass. 1987) (grouping CERCLA with other statutes notable for "inarfful draft-
manship" created in "'harried and hurried' atmosphere prevalent during the final days of a
legislative session" and which achieve "a certain quirky notoriety precisely because they
are so badly drafted as to be virtually incomprehensible" (citations omitted)); Mayor &
Bd. of Aldermen v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D.NJ. 1985) (interpreting
ambiguous portions of CERCLA and remarking on rushed nature of legislative action);
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985) (attributing awk-
wardness of statutory language to hurried passage of legislation in lame-duck session of
Congress); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 n.12 (N.D. Ohio 1933)
(same).
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mise. House and Senate negotiators quickly drafted a bill that the
Senate approved on November 24.95 The House approved the bill on
December 3, "groaning all the way. ' ' 96 Finally, President Carter
signed CERCLA into law on December 11.97 The implicit assumption
for the rushed enactment of CERCLA was the concern that the in-
coming Congress and President would not approve similar legisla-
tion.98 In other words, they acted for the precise reason that Congress
and the states had disapproved by adopting the Twentieth Amend-
ment nearly sixty years before.
Stephen Breyer's appointment to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit becomes invalid as well. President Carter
nominated Breyer to the First Circuit on November 13, 1980-nine
days after Carter lost his bid for reelection.99 Before then, Carter's
judicial nominating commission had proposed eleven other candidates
for that seat.lo0 Breyer was widely known and respected by both
Democrats and Republicans in Congress by virtue of his service as
Chief Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, a job he would
soon have to forfeit when Republican Senator Thurmond became the
committee's chair in January 1981. Senator Kennedy-the outgoing
chair of the committee-championed Breyer's appointment to the
court of appeals, and leading Republican members of the Judiciary
Committee enthusiastically supported Breyer.'0 l That bipartisan sup-
port explains why the Senate acted on Breyer's nomination instead of
95 See 126 Cong. Rec. 31,018 (1980) (tabulating Senate votes for November 24, 1980).
96 Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 1
(1982); see also 126 Cong. Rec. 31,974 (1980) (statement of Rep. Biaggi) (complaining that
Senate sent its CERCLA bill to House "on a take-it-or-leave-it basis"); id. at 31,979 (state-
ment of Rep. Clinger) (speaking "in support of this bill, flawed though it may be, because I
am convinced that [it] is the last train that is going to leave the station in this session of
Congress"); id. at 31,970 (statement of Rep. Harsha) (objecting to Senate's "ultimatum" to
"take it or leave it"); id. at 31,974 (statement of Rep. Moore) ("I do not believe we ought
to vote for legislation in the closing hours, being told this is our last chance and pass bad
legislation, hoping we can correct it later.").
97 President's Remarks to Congress on Signing the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 3 Pub. Papers: Jimmy Carter 2797, 2798
(Dec. 11, 1980) (recording signature of CERCLA by President Carter).
98 See Grad, supra note 96, at 34 (1982) (explaining that "many supporters of the bill
saw this as a final opportunity to get some resolution of the issues, even if imperfect, for
fear that to wait for the next session of Congress might well bring them even less").
99 See 126 Cong. Rec. 29,520 (1980) (acknowledging Senate receipt of Breyer's
nomination).
100 See id. at 31,450 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (listing candidates previously recom-
mended for that seat).
101 See, e.g., id. at 32,999-33,000 (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at 31.441-42 (statement of
Sen. Kennedy); id. at 31,442 (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
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the seventeen other judicial nominations already proposed by Presi-
dent Carter. 0 2
Nonetheless, the timing of the nomination provoked opposition.
Senator Humphrey asserted that
it is most unwise for the Senate... to be moving to confirm a nomi-
nation in the closing week, the closing days, the closing hours, of a
lameduck session, especially when that nomination has been made
by a lameduck President,... a man whose programs and outlook
have been repudiated by the voters.' 03
Senator Morgan-a defeated lame-duck member himself-com-
plained that the nomination had bypassed standard procedures as it
was rushed through the Senate.104 Breyer's nomination was thus sub-
jected to a filibuster. The Senate voted for cloture by a 68-28 vote,105
and it confirmed Breyer's appointment on December 9 by an 80-10
vote. 0 6 He was the only judicial nominee approved by the lame-duck
Senate in 1980. Breyer was thus rescued from a lame-duck job by the
nomination of a lame-duck President and confirmation by a lame-
duck Senate. 0 7
102 See id. at 31,443 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (listing four pending circuit court
nominations and 13 pending district court nominations); id. at 31,459 (Judiciary Committee
staff memorandum stating that "[t]he minority have made clear that they will approve
Breyer but no one else").
103 Id. at 31,443 (statement of Sen. Humphrey); see id. at 33,003 (statement of Sen.
Humphrey) ("It is a nomination made by a lameduck President that is about to be acted
upon by a lameduck Congress."); id. at 31,464 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (arguing that
any new judicial appointments should await newly elected Republican leadership); id. at
31,445 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (objecting to "the bizarre, unique, and singular cir-
cumstances under which this particular nomination now pending was pushed to the point
of appearing to be a subject of a railroading").
104 See id. at 31,449 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (describing how Judiciary Committee,
ABA, and FBI had all approved nomination six days after it was made); see also id. at
31,450-51 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (characterizing nomination as "a purely political ma-
neuver" resulting from deal between President Carter and Senator Kennedy).
105 See id. at 33,009.
106 See id. at 33,013. The 1994 vote on Justice Breyers elevation to the Supreme Court
was nearly identical. See 140 Cong. Rec. S10,137 (daily ed. July 29, 1994) (recording 87-9
vote for confirmation).
107 The constitutionality of Breyer's Frst Circuit appointment probably became moot
once a Senate that was not sitting in a lame-duck session confirmed Justice Breyer's confir-
mation to the Supreme Court, but there is a contrary argument. Cf. Mark V. Mishnet,
Clarence Thomas: The Constitutional Problems, 63 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 466, 477 (1995)
(concluding that Justice Thomas lied concerning his relationship with Anita Hill and sug-
gesting that "the remedy for Thomas's perjury is that citizens should not regard cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court by a vote of five to four, with Thomas in the majority, as law
at all").
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CONCLUSION
The Twentieth Amendment watched decisions like Seminole
Tribe unfold with wonder and pride. It had always been overlooked
during the important debates over constitutional law, and now it saw
an opportunity to take its own place in that fray. The TWentieth
Amendment even began to suppose that the congressional declaration
of war in December 1941 survived only because the attack on Pearl
Harbor did not occur during an election year. Then someone told it
that no court would actually hold that GATT or CERCLA is uncon-
stitutional, or that Stephen Breyer's tenure on the First Circuit was in
any way constitutionally tainted. That would never happen, it was
said, because the Supreme Court liked textualist theories of interpre-
tation. The Twentieth Amendment protested that its purpose was to
abolish lame-duck congressional sessions as inconsistent with repre-
sentative democracy, but it was reminded that this purpose was not
achieved by the words of the Amendment itself. So the Twentieth
Amendment resigned itself to live in obscurity under a theory of con-
stitutional interpretation that requires a textual anchor for any rule of
constitutional law. But then the Twentieth Amendment remembered
Seminole Tribe. If purpose is more important than text, as Seminole
Tribe and the history of Eleventh Amendment interpretation suggests,
then the Twentieth Amendment might spring to life after all. Excit-
edly, the Twentieth Amendment spread the news about Seminole
Tribe to the Third Amendment, the Twenty-Second Amendment, and
its other forgotten friends. For who knows what surprises lay hidden
in the history of other obscure constitutional provisions, if only a law
professor has time enough to find them?
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